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Abstract—Smart cities need to connect physical devices as
a network to improve the efficiency of city operations and
services. Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is a key com-
ponent of smart cities. ITS supports the communication between
vehicles to improve the driving experience and achieve active
transportation. The communication is provided using Vehicle-
to-Everything (V2X) communication technology. Cyber-security
is currently one of the main challenges facing V2X technology.
A V2X communication link is vulnerable to various cyber-
attacks including internal and external attacks. Internal attacks
cannot be detected by traditional security schemes because the
compromised nodes have valid credentials. Thus, a trust model
is needed to defend against them. In this paper, a global roaming
trust-based security model is proposed for V2X communication.
Each vehicle has a global knowledge about malicious nodes
in the network. In addition, we conduct various experiments
with different percentage of malicious nodes to measure the
performance of the proposed model. Simulation results show
that the proposed model improves False Negative Rate (FNR)
by 33.5% in comparison with the existing model.
Index Terms—Trust, V2X, Malicious, Vehicle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is one of the leading
smart systems which have been developed to obtain reliable
transportation. Each vehicle can establish a communication
with other vehicles and infrastructure units using Vehicle-
to-Everything (V2X) communications. Vehicles include all
moving road entities such as cars, bicycles, buses, trains
and motorcycles. Each road entity periodically broadcasts a
message which contains status information such as speed,
directions and location. V2X supports several types of com-
munication links as shown in Fig.1, e.g. Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V), Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P), Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G)
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I).
As a consequence, the communication link between road
entities is exposed to either internal or external cyber-attacks.
External attacks means unauthorized nodes launch the mali-
cious behavior. However, the network can be protected against
these attacks by applying traditional security schemes such as
encryption and authentication. Internal attacks means autho-
rized nodes initiate the malicious behavior. The compromised
A. Alnasser is also with School of Engineering and Computing Sciences,
Durham University, Durham.
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Fig. 1. V2X communication links
nodes are hard to be detected because they have valid cre-
dentials. As a result, a trust-based model was suggested to
protect the network against internal attacks [1]. It is based on
continuous monitoring for the surrounding nodes' behavior.
When a misbehavior node is detected, a warning alarm is sent
throughout the network [2].
Recent research focus on developing security models that
provide data confidentiality in V2X communications. For
instance, Liu et al. [3] designed a privacy-preserving ad
conversion protocol for V2X-assisted proximity marketing that
achieves input certification and output verifiability against
malicious ad networks. Also, Ulybyshev et al. [4] suggested
a data exchange method for V2X communication systems,
which provides data confidentiality and integrity. The method
supports encrypted search over encrypted vehicle records that
could be stored in untrusted cloud. In addition, Simplicio et
al. [5] improved the structure of SCMS's certificate revocation
and linkage approach by addressing some limitations. The
proposed modifications support the temporary revocation and
linkage of pseudonym certificates. Furthermore, Cheng et al.
[6] presented a remote attestation security model based on a
privacy-preserving blockchain. The model is comprised of two
main parts. The first is identity authentication; and the second
is the calculation of the nodes to make final decisions and
write them into data blocks.
Moreover, various security models have been suggested
to ensure the authentication in V2X networks. For instance,
Yang et al. [7] implemented an authentication model for
V2X communications. The model consists of two schemes for
various communication types. One scheme was designed for
V2V communication, while the other was suggested for V2I
communication. Also, Villarreal-Vasquez et al. [8] proposed
a dynamic approach which achieves the trade-off between
safety, security and performance of V2X systems. However,
the analysis is concentrated on V2V communications which
are compliant with IEEE802.11p. In addition, Kiening et al.
[9] studied the security requirements for V2X systems to
design Trust Assurance Levels (TAL). They designed a certifi-
cation framework to support trust establishment between road
entities in V2X communication. Indeed, the node is trusted
when it is correctly authenticated. Also, Ahmed and Lee [10]
performed an evaluation for the security services of the new
LTE-based V2X architecture. Based on their evaluation results,
they proposed a practical solution to provide privacy and
achieve basic security requirements of message exchange in
V2X network. Also, Jung et al. [11] suggested a procedure and
test scenario to achieve secure communication for autonomous
cooperation driving. The procedure is configured according to
the following phases: issuing certificates, key and certificate
installation and secure communication. On the other hand,
some research provide a solution for data integrity. The pro-
posed model in [12] considered the security in sensing systems
for V2X networks because the vehicular network relies on
sensor information to achieve safe traffic. It was developed
to defend against both false data injection and packet drop
attacks. All these solutions can protect the network against
external attacks only. However, the vehicular network should
also be safeguarded against internal attacks.
To overcome these limitations, this paper proposes a global
roaming trust-based model for V2X communications. We
evaluate the performance of the proposed model by comparing
it with an existing model [13]. The simulation results show that
the proposed model outperforms the existing one. This paper
makes two main contributions to the field of vehicular network
security:
• This paper proposes a global roaming trust-based model
for V2X communication. Different from existing re-
search, the nodes have global knowledge about malicious
nodes in the network.
• This paper compares the performance of the proposed
model with the exsiting model in [13]; our model im-
proves the False Negative Rate (FNR) with 33.5% when
the percentage of malicious nodes is around 87.5%.
The paper is organised as follows: in section II we describe
the proposed system model. In section III we present a detailed
description of the proposed trust model. In section IV we
present the simulation setup parameters and conduct various
experiments to measure the model performance. In section V
we evaluate the proposed model by comparing it with the
existing model [13]. Finally, Section VI concludes the overall
work.
II. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
The considered network consists of N road entities, which
move at various speeds, andM fixed Road Side Units (RSUs).
Each road entity sends three types of messages: Beacon
message which is sent periodically to inform the surrounding
nodes about its current speed, location and direction; trans-
action message which contains confidential information and it
is sent to the core network; and warning message that is sent
to the surrounding RSUs when a malicious node is detected.
Each time the road entity sends a message to the core network,
it should go through the following phases:
• Connectivity phase: each road entity examines its connec-
tivity with the core network and the surrounding entities.
• Communication phase: if the source entity has a connec-
tion with the core network, it forwards its packet to the
nearest RSU. Otherwise, the packet is sent to a trusted
entity to relay them to the core network.
Moreover, the considered network has two types of nodes
which are normal and malicious nodes. The normal node keeps
monitoring the surrounding environment and sends its packets
to the core network. Also, it relays any received packet to the
nearest RSU. On the other hand, the malicious node launches
various attacks to disturb the network performance such as:
• Selective forwarding attack: occurs when the malicious
node drops some of the received packets randomly to
escape punishment.
• Recommendation attacks: happens when the malicious
node sends bogus recommendations regarding other
nodes as follows:
– In good-mouthing attack, the malicious node f sends
good recommendations regarding other malicious
nodes h1, h2, ... hnp as shown in Fig.2(a). In this
attack, the malicious nodes h could be considered as
normal nodes. Thus, the malicious node f disturbs
the decision phase.
– In bad-mouthing attack, the malicious node f sends
bad recommendations regarding other normal nodes
q1, q2, ... qnp as shown in Fig.2(b). In this attack,
the normal nodes q may be classified by node i as
malicious nodes.
III. GLOBAL ROAMING TRUST-BASED MODEL
The global roaming trust-based model maintains two lev-
els of trust as shown in Fig.3: road entity level and RSU
level. Each road entity evaluates the trustworthiness of the
surrounding entities. Then, it sends warning messages to the
surrounding RSUs when a malicious node is detected. When
the RSUs receive high volume of warning messages from the
surrounding entities, they generate an alarm and send it to
the central unit. In this section, we will describe the proposed
model in details.
A. Road entity level
During time interval t, each road entity measures the
trustworthiness of all surrounding entities. Indeed, node i
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Fig. 2. General model for recommendation attacks
continuously monitors its one-hop neighbors j. Then, node i
is able to compute direct trust using the collected information.
In addition, node i sends recommendation requests to the
surrounding nodes k regarding node j. The proposed model
manages two trust components as follows.
• Current Trust - T (t)current(i,j): it is computed by node
i to evaluate the communication experience with node j
during time interval t. It is calculated using
T (t)current(i,j) =
T (t)past(i,j) + T
(t)
direct(i,j)
2
(1)
It is measured based on the following trust values:
– Past trust - T (t)past(i,j): it is a measure for the past
behavior of node j. The past trust is considered to
prevent the non-continuous malicious behavior.
– Direct trust - T (t)direct(i,j): it is an evaluation for
the communication experience with the neighboring
nodes j. It is computed using
T (t)direct(i,j) =
Successful_Interactions
Total_Interactions
(2)
Road Entities
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Central Server
Fig. 3. Trust levels in the proposed model
where Successful_Interactions is the number of
successful interactions between node i and node
j, and Total_Interactions is the total number of
interactions between node i and node j.
• Indirect Trust - T (t)indirect(i,j): it is a measure for the be-
havior of the neighboring nodes j using the surrounding
nodes' opinions. Indeed, node i collects recommendations
from the surrounding nodes regarding node j. Before
computing indirect trust, node i applies the following
steps:
– Confidence value computation- C(t)(i,k): node i mea-
sures the confidence value for each recommender
node k. C(t)(i,k) is computed by
C(t)(i,k) =
8>><>>:
1, if T (t)l(i,k)   Thmax.
Cw, if Thmin  T (t)l(i,k) < Thmax.
0, if T (t)l(i,k) < Thmin.
(3)
where Cw is the confidence weight for uncertain
recommendations.
– Recommendations clustering: node i classifies the
received recommendations into two groups which
TABLE I
LOCAL TRUST COMPUTATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
Existing of current communication
between node i and node j
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are positive and negative recommendations using
Thmin.
After that, each node i calculates indirect trust for node
j by applying different weights ↵ and   for P (t)(i,j) and
N (t)(i,j) respectively. It is calculated using
T (t)indirect(i,j) = ↵⇥ P (t)(i,j) +   ⇥N (t)(i,j) (4)
where P (t)(i,j) is the average value of positive recom-
mendations; and N (t)(i,j) the average value of negative
recommendations. The weights are computed by
↵ =
n
n+m
,  =
m
n+m
(5)
where n and m are the number of positive and negative
recommendations respectively.
• Local Trust - T (t)l(i,j): each node i is able to compute
local trust for node j and make a decision. Generally,
local trust is computed using
T (t)l(i,j) = w1 ⇥ Trust1 + w2 ⇥ Trust2 (6)
where Trust1 and Trust2 are adjusted based on three
factors which are the occurrence of current communica-
tions between node i and node j; the existence of the
recommendations about node j; and the presence of a
previous connection between node i and node j. The
measurement of Trust1 and Trust2 are described in
Table I.
In addition, trust weights w1 and w2 are changed based
on recommendation factor (RC) and the number of
neighbors. w1 and w2 are weights for indirect trust and
(direct/current or past) trust respectively. w1 represents
the recommendation rate as follows:
w1 = (m+ n)⇥ RC
Neighbors(t)
(7)
where w2 = 1 w1, and Neighbors(t) is the number of
node i neighbors at time t.
• Local decision: each node i has a local blacklist which
has a list of malicious nodes based on the local decision.
Thus, node i stops the communication with any node j
in the blacklist. The decision is made using
DLocal =
8>><>>:
Trusted, if T (t)l(i,j)   Thmax.
Uncertain, if Thmin  T (t)l(i,j) < Thmax.
Malicious, if T (t)l(i,j) < Thmin.
(8)
where Thmin and Thmax are minimum and maximum
trust thresholds respectively. When trust value exist be-
tween them, the node is classified as uncertain node. After
that, the node updates its local blacklist and sends mali-
cious and uncertain warning messages to the surrounding
RSUs.
B. RSU level
During time interval t0, where t0 > t, RSUs start trust
calculation phase. First, each RSU measures the percentage
of malicious and uncertain alarms regarding node j using
M =
m0
t0
, U =
u
t0
(9)
where m0 and u are the number of malicious and uncertain
warnings respectively. Second, each RSU is able to make a
decision regarding node j using
Decisionj = RateM  RateU (10)
where RateM and RateU are the rates of malicious alarms
and uncertain alarms respectively. They are calculated using
RateM =
M
M + U
(11)
RateU =
U
M + U
(12)
Finally, the RSU classifies node j as malicious node when
Decisionj > 0. Therefore, RSU sends malicious alarm to the
central server.
C. Global Trust decision
At this stage, central server can make global decision
regarding node j based on the alarms which are received from
RSUs.
DGlobal =
(
Malicious, if Am   Total_RSUs2   1.
Normal, Otherwise.
(13)
where Am is the number of malicious warnings that are
received regarding node j. Node j is added to the global
blacklist when it is classified as malicious node. Central server
broadcasts the updated global blacklist to RSUs. Then, RSUs
rebroadcast it again to all roads entities that are covered by the
network. The road entities updates the local blacklist based on
the received global blacklist.
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
This section describes the simulation setup used to measure
and evaluate the performance of the proposed model. In
addition, we analyse the effect of various parameters on the
false alarm rate.
A. Network specifications
In our simulations, we considered a V2X network with 24
road entities and 9 RSUs with parameters as shown in Table
II. The road entities move over an area of 900⇥ 900 m2 with
various speed ranges. The road entity sends the transaction
message to the core network directly or using a multi-hop
routing protocol.
To measure the performance of the proposed trust model,
we study various types of malicious nodes: six selective
forwarding attackers, three good-mouthing attackers and three
bad-mouthing attackers.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Simulation time (T) 100 iteration
Speed ranges
Vehicle:(10-30) m/s,
Pedestrians:(0-8) m/s
Cycles:(3-10) m/s,
Motorcycle:(10-30) m/s
Number of nodes 24 nodes
Thmax 0.7
Thmin 0.4
RC 0.3
Cw 0.9
T
(0)
l(i,j) 0.5
B. Results
In this section, we study the impact of changing various
parameters on the global trust measure and relate these to
the false alarm rate. False alarm rate includes False Negative
Rate (FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). FNR measures
the rate of undetected attacks, while, FPR measures the rate
of classifying normal nodes as malicious. In addition, we start
the simulation using the initial parameters which are Thmax =
0.9;RC = 0.3;Cw = 0.9. Then, we update their values with
the optimal onces.
1) Effect of trust thresholds on false alarm rate: The
simulation experiments were run with initial parameters. We
study how various values of Thmin has an impact on false
alarm rate. Also, it helps us to define the optimal value for
Thmin. The corresponding results are shown in Fig.4 (a). The
following remarks can be made:
• FNR increases when the value of Thmin increases;
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Fig. 4. Effect of changing trust thresholds on false alarm rate
• FPR rises significantly as long as the Thmin increases;
• the impact of Thmin is high on FPR because as long
as Thmin goes up that means the malicious range is
expanded. As a result, many normal nodes are classified
as malicious nodes;
• we found that when Thmin = 0.4, it achieves low FNR
and FPR values.
Moreover, we study how various values of Thmax has an
impact on false alarm rate. The experiment was run with initial
parameters and Thmin = 0.4. The corresponding results are
shown in Fig.4 (b). We notice that FNR slightly decreases
when the value of Thmax increases, however, the FPR slightly
goes up as long as the Thmax increases. We update initial
value of Thmax with 0.7 which is the optimal value.
2) Effect of recommendation factor (RC): The simulation
experiments were run with updated initial parameters. Here,
we study the effect of various values of RC on the false alarm
rate. By inspecting Fig.5 (a), the following remarks can be
made:
• FPR goes up when the value of RC increases to reach
approximately 0.27, however, the FNR is stable while RC
increases;
• the RC has an impact on FPR only because RC is a part
of the calculation of indirect trust weight w1. Therefore,
giving high weight to indirect trust results high FPR. As a
result, the model starts making false decisions regarding
the normal nodes.
• we choose RC = 0.3 as an optimal value which is the
same as initial value.
3) Effect of Confidence weight (Cw): We examine various
values of Cw to choose the value that achieves minimum false
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Fig. 5. Effect of changing Recommendation factor and confidence weight on
false alarm rate
alarm rate. The corresponding results are shown in Fig.5 (b).
We notice the following:
• FPR goes down when the Cw increases because we give
lower weight for the recommendations that are sent by
uncertain nodes, however, the FNR decreases slightly
when the Cw increases;
• we notice that the most of normal nodes is classified as
uncertain nodes, thus, giving their recommendations low
weight results high FPR.
• we found out that the initial value of Cw is the optimal
one.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We use the existing model in [13] as a benchmark to
evaluate the performance of the proposed model. The impact
of various rates of malicious nodes on the false alarm rate is
studied on the proposed model and existing model.
A. Effect of selective forwarding attack on FNR
Generally, when the model has a low FNR, it is able to
detect the most malicious nodes. The result that is shown
in Fig.6 (a) represents the FNR for various percentages of
malicious nodes. The following remarks can be made:
• in the existing model, the FNR reaches to 0.73 when the
percentage of malicious nodes is equal to 87.50%.
• FNR values in the proposed model is reduced. Thus, the
global decision has the minimum FNR value for all rates
of malicious nodes.
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Fig. 6. Effect of selective forwarding attack on FNR and PDR
B. Effect of selective forwarding attack on PDR
To measure the model performance, we measure the PDR
with different percentage of malicious nodes as shown in Fig.6
(b). Generally, the PDR is increasing when the percentage of
malicious nodes is increasing. In addition, the existing model
produces high PDR which results from the high FNR. On
the other hand, the proposed model has lower PDR which
improves the network performance.
C. Measuring the improvement rate
We measure the improvement rate on FNR and PDR for the
proposed model in comparison with the existing model [13] as
shown in Fig.7. We notice that the FNR is highly improved in
the proposed model when the percentage of malicious nodes
is equal to 12.50%. In addition, the rate at 50%, which is a
high percentage, increases again to around 50%.
Moreover, we notice that the proposed model provides high
improvement on PDR in comparison with the existing model,
thus, it gains better network performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a global roaming trust-based
model for the V2X network. Various malicious behaviors are
considered to study the performance of the proposed model
which are selective forwarding attack, bad-mouthing attack
and good-mouthing attack. We conducted various experiments
with different percentage of malicious nodes. Comparison
results showed that the proposed model improved FNR by
33.5% and PDR by 40% when the percentage of malicious
nodes is equal to 87.50%.
In future work, we will improve the proposed model to
consider RSU attacks.
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